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My thesis in this paper is that in ‘fiction’, or to be more precise, in 
metaphorical, poetic modes of signification, there may inhere great value, even 
therapeutic value, to the individual who is attempting to survive the 
depredations of intense distress. Moreover, my argument is that for the self to 
speak of its own experiences of madness and trauma there may be an 
imperative – an imperative necessary to survival as a self – to step outside the 
constraints of a purely informational mode of discourse. Such a modality of 
speech is very familiar to those of us who use mental health services. It is a 
discursive mode sanctioned by authority, a discursive mode which surrounds 
us, interpellates us, even before we begin to speak, a mode which translates the 
extraordinary, the bizarre and the profoundly disorientating into the 
medicalised language of diagnosis, prognosis, symptoms, and treatment. 
Within this discursive realm, experience which challenged rationality and 
conventional narrative framings of the world is remade, and through this 
remaking is changed beyond recognition. These medicalised, positivistic 
modes of speaking about experience may be, I want to argue, not only 
inadequate, but actually harmful to the individual employing them. 
 The thinking informing this paper was prompted in part by the recent 
renewal of interest in and expansion of the cognitive behavioural therapies. 
Readers will be aware of the government’s announcement, on World Mental 
Health Day 2007, that £170m will be spent by 2010 on increasing access to 
psychological therapies for depression and anxiety. More personally, my 
thoughts were prompted by a conversation with my own NHS psychotherapist 
who I had been seeing fortnightly for several months following an eruption of 
severe distress in my life. Although nominally working within a CBT 
framework, I was fortunate that he was willing to step outside the limits of that 
psychotherapeutic approach. Using a reasoned, informational style of 
discourse, I had been trying for some time to describe to him a particularly 
distressing and bewildering series of mental experiences. However, I was 
finding it very difficult to do so in such a way that anything I felt to be 
meaningful or approaching the nature of those experiences was said.  Instead, 
what my speech had made present in the room was an account which ran 
parallel with, but never met, my experience; between what had been said and 
what had not was a gap which seemed unbridgeable and absolute. I voiced my 
frustration at this, and my therapist suggested I ‘try speaking differently’, 
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abandon my attempt to make everything clear, and to try using a more creative 
approach to signify distress. 
 Self-consciously at first, I did what he suggested. I told him a story in 
which I was transformed into a winged beast which inhabited a desolate 
landscape, a beast whose language was unknown to me, who communicated 
with animals rather than humans, and who would periodically spontaneously 
catch fire. At the end of the story, motivated by a compulsion to explain myself 
rationally, I began haltingly to try and interpret what I had said, but the 
therapist cut me short and suggested that interpretation was not important, that 
it was fine if meaning remained unfinalised and open, and that if I felt I had 
said something which mattered to me, which held significance for me, then that 
was enough. He was right. In that conversation I felt I had come closer to 
revealing my ‘truth’ than I had in any previous therapeutic encounter. Given 
that I have been a user of mental health services for over thirty years, this 
seemed significant. 
 The importance of modes of speaking other than the literal and the rational 
was noted by one of the most influential proponents of the model of ‘narrative 
identity’, Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur repeatedly insisted that fictional as well as 
non-fictional narratives are important to the construction and maintenance of 
human identity. Thus, he argued that, “Fiction contributes to making life, in the 
biological sense of the word, a human life” (Ricoeur, 1991a, p.20). Narrative 
fiction “is an irreducible dimension of self-understanding” (p.30) by means of 
which we experiment with possible identities and identifications. In addition, 
with regard to the value of a purely informational discourse, Ricoeur (1991b, 
p.130) asserts that “it is in the moment of the emergence of a new meaning 
from the ruins of literal predication that imagination offers its specific 
mediation”. For Ricoeur (1991c, p.189), self-knowledge “is an interpretation”, 
and the “privileged mediation” of this interpretation draws on the narrative 
modalities of both history and fiction. 
 Such insights are probably familiar to us all. We will almost certainly 
assent to the proposition that in order to represent the experience of being 
human a form of language other than instrumental, rational discourse is 
needed. Our experience is freighted with uncertainty and doubt; our ecstasies 
and griefs cannot be adequately captured in mundane speech; we pass through 
moments where the self is dark to itself; our experience of time is often 
paradoxical and complex; and so on. However, for the mad, there may be a 
particular urgency to the call for other modes of speech. This is because living 
with severe and enduring distress means to exist, to a greater or a lesser degree, 
in a universe whose limits are strictly defined by authoritative discourses which 
close down the possibility of imagining oneself differently, of reconstructing 
the story of the self – of finding different, better, horizons under which to live. 
To live under such horizons, I suggest, might restore a sense of dignity and 
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worth to the vulnerable excluded subject.  To live in such a space may open the 
possibility of ‘health’. 
 To unpack these last assertions further, it is worth referring to some of 
Foucault’s contentions concerning the vexed relationship between reason and 
madness. Reason and madness, he argues, have become “external” to each 
other, “deaf to all exchange [...] as though dead to one another” (Foucault, 
1999, p.xi). This schism exists in order to secure the hegemony of reason, a 
hegemony predicated on the exclusion of madness. Indeed, reason’s very 
identity is dependent on its power to exclude – to admit the language of 
madness would be to collapse not only its power but its essence. Therefore the 
subversive truths of madness have been silenced, deemed nonsensical and 
worthless. And because of this breach, to represent madness in the language of 
reason is a categorical impossibility, for “by assuming an appearance in the 
order of reason” madness becomes “the contrary of itself” (Foucault, 1999, 
p.107). 
 Thus, to speak of the experience of madness in the language of ‘reason’, 
and here we might gloss this term to include scientistic, medicalised discourse, 
does a kind of violence to the experience so addressed. Experience is wrenched 
from the perplexing, the singular, the aporetic and is cloaked in the monologue 
of reason. This is what happened to me in the early part of that psychotherapy 
session, and it has happened on many other occasions when I have sought 
psychiatric help. This is hardly surprising. The textures of madness and trauma 
include a host of characteristics which by their nature resist the literal 
predications of fixity and reference. Such characteristics include: nameless and 
consuming distress; objectless and inconsolable grief; radical alterity; paradox; 
terror; haunting; temporal and category dislocations; the suspension of logic; 
chaos; stasis; too much speech; too little speech; obsession; the darkness of the 
self; self-alienation and loss; the continual return of history; multiple voices. 
To represent such experiences in the language of medicalised reason is to 
change them into something else. 
 Such concerns accrue greater significance when we remember that ‘mental 
illness’ is not like other illnesses. Whereas physical illness affects a part of the 
self, ‘mental illness’ is often seen and experienced as a condition which 
potentially affects the whole person. Moreover, when ‘mental illness’ is at its 
most acute, the subject’s experience will be that there is nothing other than 
‘illness’ present. I become, in effect, my ‘illness’ - which shadows every aspect 
of my identity. Many, perhaps most, current medical interventions treat the 
‘symptoms’, or content, of distress/illness as of little importance, or at least 
proceed from a view that the content of distress is something to be ‘recovered’ 
from. Whether using drugs or CBT or a combination of the two, a teleological 
view implicitly structures the therapeutic encounter in which distress is a 
problem to be ‘overcome’. The content of distress thus comes to resemble 
waste which must be cleared so that living can begin. Yet, if the individual is 
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consumed by her distress, then the corollary of this stance is that the whole of 
her experience is regarded as a problem to be surmounted and of little value. 
Therefore, the whole of the self is waste which must be discarded. In the throes 
of an acute distress which is co-extensive with her very existence, the 
individual will thus come to understand that she is of no value, that she is a 
problem or a symptom to be overcome. 
 This pathologising of the very self is exacerbated by the language of 
diagnosis and treatment. If my experience is wholly or in the majority defined 
by distress then the label attached to my distress will subsume all that I am. My 
experience of distress (as with my experience of anything else) will be unique, 
refracted as it is through the complexities of my history, my class, age, gender, 
race, education, and so on. Labels such as ‘schizophrenia’ or ‘depression’ 
relegate me to a pre-defined category which is not tailored to my unique 
singularity, and do a violence to the intrinsic strangeness and richness of my 
experience. 
 The medicalised language of illness is a discourse sanctioned by power and 
hard to resist when one is in the limit-state of radical vulnerability. If I introject 
this discourse what emerges is a kind of death-in-life. For now that I have a 
label to attach to my distress I am no longer an individual whose distress is 
refined and defined by my history, my imagination, my oppression, my 
singularity; rather I have become an instance in a broad category. Moreover, 
that category is there to define something useless, something without value, 
something to be moved through as quickly as possible so that I can return to 
‘living’. With all treatment aimed towards recovery and ‘better functioning’, 
living is something which will happen in the future. My present existence is 
without value or meaning, and, deprived of these signifiers of humanity, I have 
become a thing, waiting, hoping, for revivication. Through introjecting the 
discourse of illness, my experience of distress becomes flattened, 
homogenised, hollowed out of meaning and nuance. No longer a complex 
individual, I am ‘depressed’, ‘schizophrenic’ – and my complexity has been 
subsumed under those labels. Tragically, when I come to believe that is who I 
am, there will be little of me left. Eventually the powerful story through which 
I have been authorised to understand myself becomes who I am. Now I will 
label the richness of my experience as symptomatic; I begin to ignore it, cease 
to perceive its strangeness. 
 The irony of all this is that a road through the agonies of distress which 
leads to a more comfortable existence may be found through enriching rather 
than depleting the sense of self. I have written about this elsewhere (Stone, 
2005) so I will not rehearse the arguments again here, but in brief I would 
contend that attending to and articulating the texture and particularity of 
experience, including the experience of distress, strengthens one’s sense of 
selfhood, and that this in turn works to ameliorate the destructive power of 
distress; readers may also want to look at the work of Larry Davidson (1992; 
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2005) and James Glass (1989; 1993; 1995) on selfhood as a ‘therapeutic 
resource’. What I do want to add here, however, is the necessity of 
reconceiving the theoretical concept of narrative identity under the signs of the 
momentary and fragmentary. Arguments concerning the role of narrative in 
selfhood can easily imply that the self narrative will necessarily be a coherent, 
‘whole’ entity. In order not to disqualify vulnerable subjects as subjects, 
‘narrative identity’ needs to be distanced from any implications that the self-
narrative should be ‘complete’ or conclusive. In contrast, a conception of 
narrative and identity might be advanced in which vulnerable subjects’ lives 
are honoured by attending and granting importance to the contingent, the 
passing, the incoherent or incomplete, the frangible. 
 Such a conception of narrative identity is perhaps more likely to emerge if 
the vulnerable subject is sanctioned to employ poetic metaphorical speech. The 
fragmentary story I told my therapist had no conclusions; its meaning remained 
obscure, yet still its telling resonated with my experience of distress. I would 
go further, however, and suggest that poetic, metaphorical, speech is the only 
adequate way in which the extraordinary experiences of madness and trauma 
can be represented and imagined by the self to the self and to others. In these 
modalities of speech, there inheres the possibility that the individual may re-
emerge into or reclaim the richness of their own experience, may re-enter the 
realm of the human, may rediscover that they are not dead, but alive. It is this 
possibility which Julia Kristeva (1989, p.99), herself a psychoanalyst as well as 
a theoretician, alludes to in her book on melancholy when she writes: 
 
Sublimation’s dynamics, by summoning up primary processes and idealization, 
weave a hypersign around and with the depressive void. This is allegory, as 
lavishness of that which no longer is, but which regains for myself a higher 
meaning because I am able to remake nothingness […]. 
 
In the context of madness or trauma, such a ‘speaking otherwise’, the weaving 
of a hypersign in order to remake what had been denoted as nothingness, may 
be particularly beneficial. It may help one escape confinement in medicine’s 
positivistic text, may acknowledge complexity and uncertainty, may help 
restore dignity, may help one hear a song which plays in even the darkest 
moments. 
 One of the best examples of this discursive mode I know of is Susanna 
Kaysen’s memoir, Girl, Interrupted. Writing of her hospitalisation with BPD, 
Kaysen adopts a poetic, novelistic, literary style. Her account is conveyed via 
impressions, allusions, and the relation of fragmentary episodes through which 
the autobiographical subject and her madness are hinted at rather than pinned 
down. Moreover her account is specifically aimed at countering the positivism 
of psychiatry; indeed, a central concern in Girl, Interrupted is Kaysen’s 
resistance to the notion of a fixed, lifeless self pinned down and defined by 
medicine’s narratives, or as she describes it, “one moment made to stand still 
 Narrative and Fiction: an interdisciplinary approach 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
76 
 
 
and to stand for all the other moments, whatever they would be or might have 
been” (Kaysen, 1995, p.167). There are two interruptions in Kaysen’s account. 
Her distress, and subsequent incarceration in hospital, interrupted Kaysen’s 
life, but the static representation of that interruption (in the form of her 
psychiatric history) excludes the possibility of mobility and progression and 
reifies the transient. Girl, Interrupted is Kaysen’s attempt to recover that 
ossified self and release it into a more fluid realm. As if to emphasise the 
contrast between her impressionistic narration and the definitive, positivistic 
narratives of medicine, Kaysen includes photographic reproductions of medical 
documents relating to her illness in the memoir. This starkly highlights the 
radically different stories of her experience. The medical narrative exemplifies 
a “monologue of reason about madness”, as Foucault (1999, pp.xii-xiii) 
describes “the language of psychiatry”, its unidimensional and flat statements 
at radical variance with Kaysen’s poetically nuanced account. 
 In conclusion, then, the value of poetic, literary, metaphorical modes of 
representing experience is various. Firstly it is a way of granting attention to 
the content of distress, rescuing that experience from lifelessness and death. 
Secondly, it is an acknowledgement that human experience can never be 
adequately mapped in scientific informational discourse. Thirdly, it accords to 
the experience of suffering a dignity and value by transfiguring ‘symptoms’ 
through the language of myth, poetry, metaphor. Fourth, it allows for 
experience to be reimagined and understood in ways which are not available in 
medical discourse. Through use of literary form, unconventional grammar, etc., 
the text may approach, for instance, the ‘permanent simultaneity’ of traumatic 
being. Fifth, the use of narrative and language constructs the self as 
fundamentally incomplete, overdetermined, uncertain. 
 This last point is crucial in that our narratives of ourselves are always 
incomplete, because our existence is psychologically, linguistically, 
discursively, physically, bound to and constructed by the other/Other. Indeed 
this understanding is key to what it is to be human and to live an ethical 
existence. Literary poetic speech is defined in part by its openness to multiple 
interpretations and its resistance to closure. As such it leaves room for the 
experience of alterity to haunt its margins. (Again, this haunting stands in stark 
opposition to narrative universes of diagnosis, prognosis, recovery etc.) 
 If different modes of speaking are not made available, or sanctioned, then 
the clinical encounter may consist of two discourses – that which is produced 
by the permitted modes of speaking, and that of a kind of talk which tries to do 
justice to strangeness. One discourse will be present while the other to a greater 
or lesser extent will be unspoken, even unthought. In such a conversation, 
experience will remain untouched by what is said. And because untouched, 
unheard by the other, will not even remain experience for very long, but will be 
soon forgotten, erased, with the vulnerable subject ‘resurrected’ into a kind of 
living death. 
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